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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS UNDER THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION'
GEORGE E. HAiL*

In that vast domain of government which is the province of
But,
administrative law, classification is still haphazard.
through continued acquaintance, certain processes are beginning
to appear familiar and we may refer to them by surnames.
Among these is the administrative hearing which precedes action
of a judicial character. 2 Usually the holding of the hearing is
constitutionally required ;3 it is not given as a matter of grace:
that is, the administrative action is not merely the delivery of a
gift from the government nor of an advisory character.
The subject of this paper is the constitutional requirements 4
of such a constitutional hearing. Most of the requirements
derive from the admonition to observe due process of law. This,
of course, is a mere standard and some will question whether it
is possible or desirable to particularize it. It can be argued that
the forms of administrative action are diverse and that no good
purpose is served by an attempt to lay down rules of universal
application under the standard. Despite diversity of subject
matter, however, there are important similarities in widely
separated types of administrative action. There are universals
as well as particulars; and, where particulars are founded in
reason, comparison may be suggestive.
'This paper summarizes a study made in 1937-8 at the Harvard
Law School in Professor Felix Frankfurter's seminar on administrative law. Acknowledgment for helpful suggestions and encour-

agement is due Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Messrs. Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
Abraham H. Feller, William B. Hale, Ernest S. Ballard, William

Du Bose Sheldon and James P. Johnson. Mr. Henry Molner kindly
read proof.
* A.B., 1935, Yale; LL.B., 1938, Harvard; J.S.D., 1940, University
of Chicago.
No attempt will be made to include here discussion of hear-

ings which precede purely 'legislative' action by administrative
agencies. Of course, at times distinction my be difficult.
'In order that the administrative determination may be
endowed with a measure of finality.
'Under the Federal Constitution alone. Only cases in the
Supreme Court of the United States are cited.
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In dealing with constitutional doctrine, horizons should
extend beyond the reported decisions. Courts must and do pass
upon the wisdom of executive and legislative action. Hence, they
should take account of everything that assists in the formulation
of wisdom. Mluch help can be derived on this subject, for
instance, from the actual practices of administrative tribunals
and the results thereof. Indeed, until there is some acquaintance
with the forms of administrative action as they have naturally
developed, it is scarcely possible to grasp the problems of procedure at all. Again, the sciences of politics and psychology
may offer important suggestions. Lastly, it may be important
for a court to know something about the purpose of the
administrative authority, and thus to familiarize itself with the
basic economic problems which have been entrusted to administrative hands. But reference to all such knowledge, incomplete
though it may be, is beyond the compass of this brief paper.
NOTICE

First in time is "notice". Although the constitutional
requirement is often referred to as "notice and hearing",
perhaps implying some separability, the warning of the trial to
come is a fit starting point for analysis of the hearing. Its form
and content may have important effects upon subsequent
matters. 5
Four chief problems have been raised in regard to the
requirement of notice: the sufficiency of actual notice, the
method by which notice is to be given (personal service, publication or otherwise), the time which must elapse after notice and
before hearing, and the contents of the notice. These matters
will be examined in order.
Actual Notice. If the giving of notice for an administrative
hearing is overlooked, it may still be possible to find that the
proceedings followed due process of law. For, if the party to be
affected knows of the contemplated hearing, whether through
diligence or accident, it seems that the requirement of notice
may be dispensed with. In two earlier cases, the court seems
vaguely to have relied upon actual notice to sustain administrative proceedings which otherwise would have been invalid for
5
Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920);
Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938).
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want of notice.0 Then a recent decision squarely states that
actual notice, plus acquiescence by participation in the hearing,
validates the administrative determination3
Due process typically emphasizes form rather than substance. Thus, if proper steps are taken to secure personal
service in a civil action, the fact that the sheriff fails to make
service and perjures his return does not render the judgment
void. 8 And there is at least some authority suggesting that, in
0
But it is
judicial procedure, actual notice will not suffice.
difficult to be shocked by authority holding actual notice
sufficient in administrative proceedings. Due process does insist
upon form, but, of course, the form insisted upon must be
purposeful. Indeed, it is difficult to understand why a different
rule should apply in judicial proceedings.' 0
Method of Notice. A number of devices may be utilized to
give notice. In forcefulness-that is, in the likelihood that they
will result in actual notice-they range from a mere clause in a
statute setting the time and place of hearing to the personal
service usual to judicial proceedings. In between are a variety
of devices such as notice by mail and by publication. Certain
factors in the nature of the proceeding, especially their regularity, as to time and persons affected, are important in this connection. While no court has indicated such a classification, the
following division of administrative proceedings into four
categories is hazarded:
'First, those in the nature of annual real property taxes, of
wide application and general familiarity. Second, those proceedings which are somewhat less regular as to time, but almost
equally well known, such as examinations for admission to a
' Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy, 212 U. S. 152 (1909); Paulsen v.
Portland, 149 U. S. 30 (1893).
"Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Nebraska Commission,
297 U. S. 471 (1936); but see Security Trust Co. v. Lexington, 203
U. S. 323 (1906). Acquiescence by participation is perhaps less important than it might seem at first sight since there is a possibility
that one who has actual notice and yet fails to participate would be
caught by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
*Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236 (1914).

'Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U. S. 13 (1938).
" In some administrative hearings, particularly those of a nonadversary character, notice may be unnecessary. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure on Veteran's Admin-

istration at 11 (76 Cong. III, Sen. Doc. 186, Part 2) [hereafter cited

as 'A. G.'s Committee on Veterans' Administration', 'A. G.'s Committee on Federal Trade Commission', etc.].
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profession. Third, those wholly irregular, but commonly
attended with publicity, such as special assessments. Fourth,
those in which there is neither regularity nor widespread
publicity, such as the proceedings of the Federal Trade
Commission.
As to the first category, which is defined to include administrative proceedings of definite regularity as to time and person
affected and which are given widespread publicity, it is clearly
established that the mere mention in the statute book of the
matter suffices for notice. 11 Granting that such notice may be of
little assistance beyond aid in verifying suspicions and that the
2
rule derives largely from long unopposed custom,' there seems
no great injustice in requiring a degree of diligence from taxpayers.13 For this category includes a large number of tax
matters and it must be rare that the property owner or income
earner does not know that the government is his profit-sharing
partner.
Second, as to proceedings less regular in time but almost
equally well known, it seems also established that mere statutory
notice suffices. This is the result which has been reached in cases
involving the regulation of public utility rates 14 and the registration and licensing of physicians. 15 In view of the notoriety of
such matters among the group specially affected, it is difficult to
quarrel with this result.
Third, as to proceedings which are without regularity as to
time but are attended by publicity. The special assessment is a
good example: while it may be levied at any time, the proceedings are often generally known, not only because the daily press
reports such matters but also because the improvement
"'Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660 (1890); Pittsburgh Railway
v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (1890) (not citing Palmer v. McMahon);
Merchants Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461 (1897); Clement

Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 120 (1913); ef. Kentucky Railroad Tax

Cases, 115 U. S. 321 (1885); Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U. S. 255
(1903).
22

per Fuller, C. J. in Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660 at 669f

(1890); see McGehee, Due Process of Law, at 239.

'At times the degree of diligence required is not slight. It
seems to be incumbent upon taxpayers to keep track of all adjournments of administrative hearings. Earnshaw v. United States, 146
U. S. 460 (1892); Lander v. Mercantile Bank, 186 U. S. 458 (1902).
" San Diego Land Company v. National City, 174 U. S. 739
(1899); Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265 (1908).
'Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505 (1903).
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frequently is of a visible and tangible nature geographically
near the land to be assessed.
In this category it is clear that notice by publication
suffices. 10 Some doubt must be expressed, however, as to the
efficacy of a mere notice in a statute. There are decisions hinting
that it is enough, but the matter is clouded.1 7 And it would seem
preferable for courts to require notice by publication in this
category of cases.
Fourth, as to proceedings both without regularity as to time
and unattended by publicity. Here the prime example is found
in the proceedings of an administrative tribunal which is given
authority to correct practices general to an industry, profession
or to all business enterprises. Probably the device of notice by
registered mail employed by the Federal Trade Commission' s
is valid, albeit the question is undecided.' 9 Such a determination would accord with the sentiment that such notice must be
given "as the nature of the proceeding admits." 20 But it seems
doubtful whether notice by publication is enough in this
category. Proceedings of this type bear a strong resemblance
"Lent v.Tilson, 140 U. S. 316 (1891); Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896); see Huling v. Kaw Valley Rail-

way, 130 U. S. 559 at 562 (1889); cf. Fidelity Bank v. Swope, 274
U. S.123 (1927).

"'Thus, in North Laramie Land Company v. Hoffman, 268 U. S.

276 (1925) the statute granting eminent domain powers to county
commissioners provided that within a certain period after the commissioners' appraisal of the land the owner could obtain a hearing in
court. It further provided that the proceedings of the board of commissioners were to be published. Thus by the combination of publication of the appraisal and the provision for hearing in the statute
the landowner could secure notice. The statute was an integral part
of this notice. Held, constitutional. Cf. Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701 (1884), which may involve an administrative
determination without finality, which is also true of North Laramie
Land Company v. Hoffman, supra. Later citations of Hagar v. Reclamation District confuse rather than clarify: Kentucky Railroad
Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321 at 336 (1885); Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U. S. 589 (1931); Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164
U. S. 112 at 174 (1896); Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U. S. 276 at
280 (1905). The matter is further obfuscated by language to the
effect that less is required when the proceedings are akin to actions
in rem. McGehee, Due Process of Law, at 55.
28Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission,
at 55.
"See Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181 at 192
(1902) (bankruptcy court); cf. Gallup v. Schmidt, 183 U. S. 300
(1902).
Weper Fuller, C. J., in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186
U. S. 181 at 192 (1902); cf., e.g., American Land Company v. Zeiss,
219 U. S. 47 at 66 (1911).
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to the ordinary judicial law suit, where personal service is the
rule.21 Perhaps the judicial practice should be less exacting,
22
but it is hard to see any reason for a difference.
Interval Between Notice and Hearing. To enable a party
notified to be present at the hearing and to prepare his case, it is
clear that notice must precede hearing by some period of time.
Short intervals, however, have not been found invalid23 although
24
it has been intimated that a matter of hours will not suffice.
There seems no reason to believe that a different rule is or should
25
be applied than that which obtains in judicial proceedings.
Much should depend, of course, upon the subject matter of the
hearing. It may take months adequately to prepare the
presentation of evidence bearing on public utility rates while a
few days may suffice for a hearing looking to the revocation of a
pawnshop license.
Contents of the Notice. A distinction should be drawn, in
discussing the required contents of the notice, between the
necessity of naming the party to be notified 26 and that of
describing the action contemplated. For, if the party is
seriously misnamed, the whole notice may be vitiated; while, if
the action is merely vaguely described, the party is at least
27
aware of the danger ahead. Even in the absence of authority,
"Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U. S. 503 (1876); but cf. Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U. S. 352 (1927).
"As in judicial proceedings (Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261
(1912) ) a secondary method of notice may be resorted to in case the
primary method falls. Thus, if personal service proves impossible,
the substitute method of publication suffices. McMillen v. Anderson,
95 U. S. 37 (1877) semble. And probably, as in judicial proceedings
(see Holmes, J., in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 at 92 (1917)),
the substitute method employed must be the next best.
'Campbell
v. Olney, 262 U. S. 352 (1923) (twenty days);
Bellingham Bay Railway v. New Whatcom, 172 U. S. 314 (1899) (ten
days; re-assessment of levy for special improvements); cf. Earnshaw
v. United States, 146 U. S. 60 (1892).
- See United States ex rel. Turner v. Fisher, 222 U. S. 204 at 208
(1911); See also Brewer, J., dissenting, in United States v. Tuck, 194
U. S. 161 at 178 (1904); United States v. Toy, 198 U. S. 253 at 268
(1905).
"For the rule in judicial proceedings, cf. Roller v. Holly, 176
U. S. 398 (1900) with Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480 (1875).
Particularly when notice is by some means other than personal
service.
27 Cf. Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674 (1898)
(mistake of de
minimis character). As to judicial proceedings cf. Webster v. Reid,
52 U. S. 437 (1850) with Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385 (1914).
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then, it is safe to assert that a serious misnomer would render
notice void.
Mere vagueness of the complaint as to the action contemplated is regularly held harmless, 28 although, of course, there
must be a limit to permissible vagueness. 29 The administrative
desire to keep the complaint broad and vague is, however, understandable if not always wholly commendable. 30
A somewhat different question is raised when the notice is
misleading. If the complaint states that hearing will be held
looking to action A, and the real purpose is to take action B,
there may be deception of a seriously prejudicial character.
Clearly such a result should be held invalid. In the single case
where the problem has been presented to the Supreme Court,
however, the deception was held to be of such slight consquence
that the order could stand.3 1
Under the Packers and Stockyards Act 32 the Secretary of
Agriculture has powers to fix prices of livestock "market
agencies." Certain stockyards commission men filed (pursuant
to statute) with the secretary a schedule of rates known as tariff
number one; before any action had been taken by the secretary
as to these rates, they were increased in what was termed tariff
"Ontario Land Company v. Yordy, 212 U. S. 152 (1909) as
explained in Ontario Land Company v. Wilfong, 223 U. S. 543 (1912);
Washington ex rel., Oregon Railway v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510
(1912); Northwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Nebraska Commission, 297 U. S. 471 (1936) (opinion, per Stone, J., disappointing in
that it fails to cite earlier cases); National Labor Relations Board v.
Mackay Radio &Telegraph Company, 304 U. S.333 (1938); Consolidated Edison Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S.
197 (1938). As to judicial proceedings cf. Standard Oil Company v.
Missouri, 224 U. S.270 (1912). A more rigorous rule may be applied
as to the sufficiency of the complaint in law, Federal Trade Comnmission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920).
"Itis difficult to know what to make of the Japanese Immigrant
Case (Yamataya v. Fisher) 189 U.S. 86 (1903). It is said in the
opinion that there was adequate "informal" notice (189 U.S. at 101)
but no such assertion is made even in respondent's brief (at 3). The
notice was in English, which the alien did not understand. Held,
that the proceedings were valid. Cf. Van Vleck, The Administrative
Control of Aliens, at 99f.

" Cf. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission at 72 ff.; Attorney Generals' Committee on Division of Public Contracts at 8 ff.;

Redmond, The Securities Exchange Act (1938)

47 Yale L. J. 622,

at 637 if. See Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S.1, at 19 (1938).
" Tagg Brothers & Morehead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420
(1930).
'"Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 159, 7 U.S.C.A.,
sec. 201.
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number two. Thereupon, the secretary issued a complaint
advising the commission men that a hearing would be held.
The commission men contended that, from the wording of this
complaint, they were led to believe that only the rates of tariff
number two were in question and that, in fixing rates below those
of tariff number one, the secretary had denied them due process
of law.33 In an opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis, 34 the court
refused to hold the notice void. It will be noted that the case
does not squarely raise the problem stated: It was not a question
of doing A or doing B, but of finding an appropriate level for
rates.
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

At the hearing itself a number of problems will arise as to
the manner in which evidence may be presented. The type and
number of witnesses and documents which may be offered; the
assistance of compulsory process; the availability of an oral
hearing; presumptions and burden of proof; rules of evidence
and opportunity to attack evidence (the hearsay rule)-such
are the matters to be discussed under this heading.
Opportunity to Introduce Evidence. It has been said that
"the crucial fact in determining whether the hearing was unfair
must doubtless be the denial of opportunity to present
evidence."35 And this proposition is well understood in practice
36
if not buttressed by an overwhelming mass of direct authority.
'So far as here material, the complaint read: "it appearing to
the Secretary of Agriculture that . . . [the commission men] have
filed a new schedule of rates and charges known as Tariff No. 2 . . .
stating new rates and charges, several of which are materially different from and greater than those set forth in their schedules now on
file . . . notice . . . is hereby given that a hearing upon the
reasonableness and lawfulness of the said schedule of rates and
charges will be held . . ." Record at 19f.
" Tagg Brothers & Morehead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420
(1930).
'Powell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Immigration Proceedings (1909) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 360, at 364; Cf. Reisenfeld,
The French System of Administrative Justice (1938) 18 B. U. L. Rev.
48, 400, 715, at 727.
'See State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, at 609 (1875);
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, at 386 (1908) (Fuller, C. J., and

Holmes, J., dissenting); Baltimore & Ohio Railway v. United States,
298 U. S. 349, at 368f. (1936); Consolidated Edison Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, at 225f. (1938) (Butler and
McReynolds, J. J., dissenting; Reed and Black, J. J., concurring

specially). As to judicial proceedings, the rule is clear. Saunders
v. Shaw, 244 U. S. 317 (1917); see American Surety Company v.
Baldwin, 287 U. S.156, at 168 (1932); Georgia Railway & Electric
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Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a more fundamental error in
administrative hearings than the exclusion of relevant evidence.
Notwithstanding the soundness of this last proposition, there
appear to be certain types of administrative hearings to which
it does not apply. This, for instance, appears to be the rule
applicable to the valuation of property for the assessment of
tariff duties, 37 and there is room for the belief that a similar rule
obtains in the administrative control of aliens.2 8 If such is the
case, it is perhaps worth noting two things about the administrative hearings in question. First, the persons dealt with-taxpayers and aliens-are accustomed to a half measure of due
process. Traditionally, procedure is summary in tax matters
upon the theory that the government's need for revenue is so
great that justice must come second. And aliens are thought of
as present or entering by mere suffrance. Second, in these cases,
there is frequently real evidence which assumes dominant
importance. In customs proceedings, for example, a view of the
goods themselves speaks more eloquently than any amount of
testimony; and, in the exclusion of an alien, a laboratory test
may display unsound health so dramatically that no amount
of other evidence would be material. 39
In connection with the general rule that there must be
Company v. Decatur, 295 U. S. 165, at 171 (1935); Dohany v. Rogers,
281 U. S. 362, at 369 (1930).
t

Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U. S. 310 (1890); see Origet v. Had-

den, 155 U. S. 228, at 238 (1894); Freund, Administrative Powers,
at 556f. Cf. Tariff Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 114, at 186; Tariff Act of
1930, 46 Stat. 590, at 730, 19 U.S.C.A., sec. 1501, creating the United
States Customs Court, to which, of course, all evidence may be

presented.
"The following authorities present a confused picture: Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U. S. 652 (1892); Japanese Immigrant Case
(Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U. S. 86 (1903); United States v. Toy, 198
U. S. 253 (1905) (see dissent of Brewer and Peckham, J. J.); United
States v. Tuck, 194 U. S. 161 (1904); followed in Yow v. United
States, 208 U. S. 8 (1908). It is not wholly clear that due process
protection extends to the exclusion and expulsion processes, particularly in the absence of a claim of citizenship. Cf. Fat v. White,
253 U. S. 454 (1920); Tod v. Waldman, 266 U. S. 113 (1924). See
also Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of Aliens, at 158f, and

the cases cited above.
" Of course irrelevant and repetitious evidence may be excluded.
There must be a limit to individual argument if government is to go
on-per Holmes, J., in Bi-Metallic Investment Company v. State
Board, 239 U. S. 441, at 445 (1915).

KENTUCxY LAW JOURNAL

opportunity to present evidence a difficulty arises when only a
40
vicarious hearing is granted.
If there has been a previous hearing on the same issues
between the same parties and no new circumstances are shown, a
second hearing should not be necessary. 41 Nor should another
hearing be required when only the formal grounds of controversy differ. 42 But the matter is more troublesome when B
demands a hearing on evidence substantially identical to that
just considered in a hearing granted to A. Suppose A and B
are carriers serving the same geographical area; must an
administrative tribunal sitting to fix the rates of B listen to a
mass of evidence which it has sifted thoroughly in the hearing
afforded A ? Perhaps the answer to this question may be found
in calling this type of proceeding quasi-legislative, and, hence,
not governed by the rules applicable to quasi-judicial hearings.
But suppose a proceeding before the Federal Trade Commission: A is a manufacturer; it is shown that A grants commissions to the salesmen employed by retail dealers who sell A's
wares. Admitting the granting of commissions, A introduces
evidence in an attempt to establish that its action does not
constitute an "unfair trade practice". This evidence is carefully weighed by the commission which determines, however,
that the practice is unfair. Now a complaint issues against B,
a second manufacturer, alleging the same action. Must B be
permitted to introduce at its hearing the same evidence put
43
forth by A to prove that the practice is not unfair?
Power to Compel Testimony; Affording Process. Whatever doubts may remain as to the constitutional power of an
administrative tribunal to compel testimony when acting in a
quasi-legislative capaeity, 44 it now seems clear that such a power
, No attempt will be made here to discuss the question of necessary parties to administrative proceedings.
'And so held. Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railway, 236 U.S. 434
(1915); Georgia Public Service Commission v. United States, 283 U.S.
765 (1931); Alabama v. United States, 283 U.S. 776 (1931).
'Manufacturers' Railway v. United States, 246 U.S. 457 (1918).
" The decisions furnish no direct answer. Perhaps the solution
lies in a distinction between something like questions of pure fact

and of fact-law-discretion. See the hint of Holmes, J., in United
States v. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railway, 226 U.S. 14 at 20
(1912).
"Lilienthal, Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 694.

ADMINISTRATIVE

HEARINGS

may be exercised when the tribunal acts quasi-judicially.4 5
Such power, however, at least as to federal agencies remains
subject to the prohibition upon unreasonable searches and
seizures 40 and the privilege against self-incrimination of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 47 While the latter amendment
sounds as if it might apply only to criminal trials, it has been
construed to include civil judicial actions 48 and apparently also
extends to administrative proceedings. 49 Presumably the extent
and scope of the privilege are the same as in judicial
proceedings.50
A more vital question today is whether a party to an
administrative hearing is entitled, as of right, to the assistance of
compulsory process in securing evidence. As to matters regarding taxation5 1 and control of aliens,52 it appears that there is no
obligation to afford process. But, in the remaining fields of
administrative action, less subject to a tradition of summary
procedure, the matter is doubtful. In several cases 53 the court
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447
(1894) (Brewer and Jackson, JJ., dissenting; Field, J., taking no
part). Doubt remains as to whether the administrative authority
itself may punish for contempt. id. at 485.
"As to the scope of the prohibition, particularly in comparison
with judicial proceedings, the authorities are meager. Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904); Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 245 U.S. 33 (1917); Federal Trade
Commission v. American Tobacco Company, 264 U.S. 298 (1924);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361 (1911); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913).
"As to state tribunals, there appears to be no such limitations.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
See Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause (1930)
29 Mich. L. Rev. 191, at 202.
"See Corwin, op. cit. supra note 47, at 2f, collating the
authorities.
"United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923);
United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927).
But see Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of Aliens at 172.
' United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, op. cit. supra note 49
(remote and collateral evidence); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v.
Commissioner, supra note 49 (waiver, see, as to judicial proceedings,
Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 at 144 (1928) ).
Immunity
probably removes the bar (cf. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896),
but statutes have been construed to extend the immunity only to
compelled testimony. Sherwin v. United States, 268 U.S. 369 (1925).
Cf. Freund, Administrative Powers at 192.
"Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660 (1890).
"2How v. North, 223 U.S. 705 (1911) as explained in Suey v.
Backus, 225 U.S. 460 (1912).
"'Louisville & Nashville Railway v. Finn, 235 U.S. 601 (1914)
(argument dismissed on grounds that no actual prejudice was shown
-- an opinion subject to serious question in view of modem notion

K. L. J.-2
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dallied with this matter. Finally, the issue was more squarely
54
presented.
A proceeding was instituted looking to the revocation of a
physician's license. There was no provision for compulsory
process and the physician, whose license had been revoked,
complained thereof. The statute, however, did provide for the
taking of depositions, and a general statute authorized officers
taking depositons to compel the attendance of witnesses. It was
held that there had been no denial of due process. Mr. Justice
Stone's opinion, however, is unsatisfactory in that there is no
discussion of the earlier authorities and particularly in that it
displays a confused notion of the necessity of some type of
compulsory process. To some 55 it has suggested that the absence
of the power to compel testimony by deposition would be fatal
to the proceedings.
Much will depend upon the nature of the administrative
proceeding in this matter. It seems possible that, in some fields
of administrative action, the availability of compulsory process
is vital to adequate defense."5 In others, there may be little
likelihood that lack of process will result in prejudice.5 7 On the
whole, it would seem desirable that parties be afforded process
since it may prove valuable and should constitute little impairment of administrative effectiveness. s
Mist the Hearing Be Oral? Normally a hearing is conceived of as an oral affair; but it seems possible to think of a
hearing as simply an opportunity to submit paper testimony.5 9
There are hints in some authorities that the hearing must be
that procedural requirements are independent of substantive results.
Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915) ); Washington
ex rel Oregon Railway v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510 (1912) (no showing
that compulsory process actually unavailable).
"Missouri ex rel Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926).
e.g., Freund, Note (1927) 21 IIl. L. Rev. 493.
SSee Redmond, The Securities Exchange Act (1938) 47 Yale
L.J. 622 at 639; Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of Aliens at
163f; A.G.'s, Committee on Post Office Department at 30.
" A.G's, Committee on Division of Public Contracts at 13.
'Cf. the Walter-Logan Bill (S. 915, 76 Cong.) sec. 4 (c); Note
(1940) Compulsory Process in Administrative Proceedings, 25 Iowa

L. Rev. 646.

This, of course, would raise a good many questions, such as
affording an opportunity to-attack evidence, considered elsewhere

herein.
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oral60 and in others"' that it need not be. In still other cases the
matter is buried beneath other questions which appeared to be
2
of greater importance.
No doubt considerable savings of time could be effected if
oral hearings were dispensed with; and, as the burden of
administrative tasks increases, this may appear an attractive
method of clearing crowded dockets. It is, therefore, unfortunate that there is so little guidance in the authorities.
A good argument can be made for the requirement of oral hearing on the ground that it is a more effective safeguard of private
rights, particularly in that it embodies confrontation. 63
Burdca of Proof. Occasionally statutes or administrative
regulations provide that the burden of proof in an administrative
proceeding shall rest upon one of the parties. Or, the same
result is achieved by creating a presumption that certain facts
exist. Thus, it is possible to place one of the parties in a position
of relative advantage at the hearing. But apparently this has
not been thought objectionable from a due process standpoint. 4
Two cases are of particulAr interest. After certain taxes,
levied as part of the general program of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 193365 had been declared unconstitutional, 0
the Congress made provision for the refunding of the illegal
exactions. Under the Revenue Act of 193607 it was provided
See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 at 386 (1908); Smith v.
Hitchcock, 226 U.S. 53 at 61 (1912).
'

Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904); Home

Telephone Company v. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908); Missouri
ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926). Query, if all these

cases concerned constitutional hearings.

'State Railway Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875); Lander v.
Mercantile Bank, 186 U.S. 458 (1902); Glidden v. Harrington 189
U.S. 255 (1903); Turner v. Wade 254 U.S. 64 (1920).
See Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by
the Federal Supreme Court (1921) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 127, at 131;
Walter-Logan Bill (S. 915, 76 Cong.) sec. 4 (a), (e). The amount of
publicity which the administrative action receives may serve as a

counterweight. The expulsion of an alien might be accomplished
arbitrarily without inviting public scorn; over assessment of property
for tax purposes, however, must meet a considerable body of

informed criticism when listed publicly.
"Minneapolis Railway v. Minnesota, 193 U.S. 53 (1904); United
States v. Illinois Central Railroad, 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Anniston
Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337 (1937). cf. Brewer, J.,
dissenting, in United States v. Toy, 198 U.S. 253 at 268 (1905).
'Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 31, 7 U.S.C.A.,

sec. 601.

'United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
"Revenue Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1648 at 1747, 7 U.S.C.A. sec. 648.
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that, if the refund of processing taxes were disallowed by the
commissioner of internal revenue, the taxpayer must proceed
before an administrative board of review, created by the act.
This board was to consist of nine officers or members of the
department of the treasury, selected by the secretary. In this
proceeding it was provided that the burden of proof was upon
the taxpayer to establish that he had not "passed on" the tax (if
"passed on" the taxpayer was to be denied recovery). Furthermore, it was provided that, if the taxpayer's "margin" (of
profit) were smaller during the period of the tax, this was to be
prima faciae evidence that the tax had not been "passed on",
and, if not, that the tax had been shifted. A taxpayer, alleging
the unconstitutionality of the act, brought suit against the
collector. In Anniston Manufacturing Company v. Davis, 8
the statute was sustained against this attack. 69 Chief Justice
Hughes refused to construe the statute as requiring that the taxpayer meet the burden of proof where it is impossible to establish
whether or not the tax was "passed on" and declared that, so
construed, the act was valid. 70 As to the presumptions, these
were declared to be not wholly irrelevant and the court said that
their effect could not be determined until resort had been had to
the administrative proceeding. While the constitutionality of
these presumptions thus remains open to contest upon the part
of a taxpayer who has exhausted the statutory remedy, it should
be noted that the attack upon them in the Anniston case was
vigorous. For it was contended that, owing to the nature of the
circumstances, it would be impossible to prove the incidence of
the tax (i.e., what prices would have obtained had the A.A.A.
never come into existence). Furthermore, it was pointed out
that the taxpayer's margin might have increased or remained
the same for reasons wholly unrelated to the incidence of the tax
and therefore, that the combination of presumption and burden
of proof rendered it impossible for the-taxpayer to recover the
tax illegally collected.
61Op. cit., supra note 64.

A majority, speaking through Hughes, C.J., held the suit premature and declared that the adequacy of the administrative
remedy must be tested in practice. McReynolds, J., dissented.
Stone and Cardozo, JJ., concurred specially.
"Relying on United States v. Jefferson Electric Company, 291
U.S. 386 (1934) in which, unfortunately, this precise point received
no consideration.
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Under the'Inland Waterways Corporation Acts7 1 the Inter-

state Commerce Commission directed rail carriers to establish
through routes and joint rates with a barge line at specified rates
and divisions. These had been fixed at ex parte proceedings.
The statutes then permitted the railways to file a complaint and
to be heard as to the divisions and rates prescribed. A burden
of proof was placed upon them to show that the order was unlawful or unreasonable. These provisions were sustained in
United States v. Illinois Central Railroad72 but four justices
concurred merely on the ground of a failure to exhaust the
administrative remedy. 73 Certainly the presumption -here is
unusual: it directs the trier of fact to stand by a decision made
without a hearing unless the complainant can, to the satisfaction
74
of the trier, show the previous decision to have been wrong.

In sustaining the statute, the majority relied on a dictum in the
New England Divisions Case,7 5 which in turn relied upon two

cases which may be said to establish the "rational connection"
rule as to presumptions in judicial proceedings. 70 This rule
states that it is no denial of due process to set up a presumption
which is rationally connected with a proven fact. 77

Thus, from

the proven fact of the derailment of a train, a presumption may
arise of negligence upon the part of the carrier's servants.
The presumed fact is regarded as rationally connected with the
proven fact. In United States v. Illinois Central Railroad, however, the court is dealing with a different type of presumption.
For here the proven fact is that the commission has considered
the matter and reached a decision; the presumed fact is that
the decision is reasonable. Between the two lies conscious
human judgment rather than a chain of acts and circumstances.
The "rational connection" rule, as developed in the earlier
cases, did not apply to such a situation and, if the requirement
Inland Waterways Corporation Acts, 43 Stat. 360, 45 Stat. 978,
49 U.S.C.A. secs. 151, 153.
Op. cit. supra note 64.
"Stone, Brandeis, Roberts and Cardozo, J.J., Sutherland, J.,
delivered the opinion of the majority.
" Cf. the practice of holding hearings after taking administrative
action. Freund, Administrative Powers, at 155; e.g. Clement Bank v.
Vermont, 231 U.S. 120 (1913).
"New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184 at 199 (1923).
76Mobile Railway v. Turpinseed, 219 U.S. 35 (19D); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Company, 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
"And vice versa. Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929).
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of hearing is to retain vitality, the decision may well be
questioned. It is one thing to presume that a derailment is
caused by someone's negligence; it is quite another to presume
that someone's ex parte decision is reasonable.1 8
Aside from the special situations presented by these two
cases, there seems little objection to presumptions under the
rational connection rule.7 9 While some hardship may result-')
the same effect can be obtained simply by the licensing system.
For instance, instead of empowering a board to order employers
to desist from "unfair labor practices," the legislature could
require that all employers secure a license and that no license
be granted unless the employer show himself not to be engaged
in such practices. Thus, the burden of action and proof is thrust
upon the employer. 8 ' Again, it is difficult to see why administrative procedure should be more constitutionally* restricted
than judicial procedure.8 2
Rules of Evidence-There has been considerable discussion
in legal periodicals s as to whether the rules of evidence known
to actions at law should be applied in administrative hearings.
From a constitutional point of view, however, only a few of the
rules have been examined to determine whether failure to abide
by them vitiates the hearing. It is of course well understood
that some of the rules may be dispensed with.84 But which
ones? Often statutes and courts declare that the "technical"
7 Query, if this decision may be wholly supported on the ground

that the administrative action was quasi-legislative.
"Morgan, Federal Constitutional Limitations Upon Presumptions Created by State Legislation, Harvard Legal Essays (1934)

323.

at

Freund, The Growth of American Administrative Law, 9 at 37.
"'Does this argument prove too much? Could the legislature
provide that, from the issuance of a complaint by the adn~nistrative
tribunal, a presumption would arise that the employer were guilty
of unfair labor practices? Is this like United States v. Illinois
Central Railroad, cited supra note 64.
'Two differences may be noted between an administrative proceeding and an action at law which may be relevant in this connection. First, an administrative proceeding is not necessarily adversary
in character. Second, an administrative determination is often a
matter of degree (of cents per kilowatt hour, for example) rather
than a judgment (that the fee of Blackacre is in A.)
U e.g., Wigmore, Administrative Boards and Commissions: Are
the Jury Trial Rules of Evidence in Force for Their Inquiries? (1922)
17 Ill. L. Rev. 263
ISee e.g. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 48 (1932).
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rules of evidence do not apply to administrative proceedings, a
statement which fails to supply answers to all problems.
The authorities as to specific rules may be summarized in
short compass. An administrative tribunal may determine the
qualifications of one appearing- before it as an expert witness.8 5
It appears probable that standards of credibility may be
created; that is, that a party be required to produce a certain
number or kind of witness.8 6 There is nothing to indicate that
88
7
witnesses need be sworn,8 that documents need be verified,
89
or that the best evidence rule obtains.
It is difficult to say in which direction the authorities point
on the admissibility of prejudicial evidence, 90 but there is every
reason to suppose that illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible.9' This is the rule obtaining in judicial proceedings 92 and
there seems no reason to make a distinction. It may be argued,'
however, that the rule whereby involuntary confessions are excluded under the Fifth Amendment does not apply to administrative tribunals.9 3
From the constitutional point of view, it should be clear
'Spiller

v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 253 U.S. 117

(1920): see Denver Union Stock Yard v. United States, 304 U.S. 470
at 477 (1938); as to judicial proceedings see Stillwell Company v.
Phelps, 130 U.S. 520 at 527 (1889); Montana Railway v. Warren, 137
U.S. 348 at 353 (1890).
"Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Sing v. United
States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901) (proceedings before United States commissioners; requirement that party produce white witnesses).
' Cf. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904);
Note (1932) 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 878 at 881. See A.G.'s Committee on
Veterans' Administration, at 20.

Spiller v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 253 U.S. 117

(1920) semble; cf. Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of Aliens

at 233.

'See

Thelen, Practice and Procedure Before Administrative

Tribunals (1928) 16 Calif. L. Rev. 208, at 216; but cf. Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Compensation, at 237.
"Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673 (1912) (evidence that other
immigrants making claim of citizenship similar to that of petitioner
had been found guilty of fraud does not vitiate hearing-questionable decision); see Lung v. Patterson, 186 U.S. 168 at 176 (1902);
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 at 480 (1936).
'See Bilokumsky v. Todd, 263 U.S. 149 at 155 (1923). But cf.
Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of Aliens, at 172.

"Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); cf. 4 Wigmore,
Evidence, secs. 2183, 2184. Of course this rule is inapplicable to state
agencies so far as the federal constitution is concerned. See Weeks v.
United States cited supra at 398.
"On the ground that administrative proceedings are always civil
(as opposed to criminal) in character. Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893); see Biokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 at 157 (1923).
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that the rules of evidence (aside from the hearsay rule) are not
obligatory. In certain proceedings, where fundamental facts
are strongly in issue and emotions strained, the hearing takes
on the aspect of a criminal trial. For such hearings great formality may be desirable; but the matter should rest in legislative discretion. 94
Hearsay-Attacks upon Evidence-Separate consideration
must be given the hearsay rule, since it has a fundamental importance lacking in the other prescriptions. That is, the introduction of hearsay evidence deprives an opponent of an
opportunity to attack the testimony by the time-honored method
of cross-examination.
It cannot be said that the court has been oblivious of the
desirability of allowing attacks upon evidence. 95 But in one field
of administrative action after another exclusion of relevant evidence has seemed too high a price to pay for due process of
law. 96 In none of these cases, however, was the hearsay admitted shown to have substantially prejudiced the opponent. 97
And the tenor of the opinions does not suggest that no attention
need ever be paid to the hearsay rule. In the latest case the
hearsay rule was cleverly incorporated into the "substantial evidence" rule. 98 Chief Justice Hughes declared:
"' It will be noted that some of the exclusionary rules, such as
those last discussed, are designed for purposes unrelated to the
proper conduct of the hearing. For instance, one reason that
involuntary confessions are excluded is to discourage "third degree"

methods. On the general subject see Stephens, Administrative
Tribunals and the Rules of Evidence, at 92 ff.; Stephan, The Extent
to Which the Fact-finding Boards Should be Bound by the Rules of
Evidence (1938) 24 A.B.A.J. 630.
"Ohio Bell Telephone Company v. Public Utilities Commission

301 U.S. 292 (1937); see Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louis-

ville & Nashville Railway, 227 U.S. 88 at 93 (1913). cf. A.G.'s Committee on Veterans' Administration at 23.
"Origet v. Hedden, 155 U.S. 228 (1894) (assessment of tariff
duties); Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660 (1890) (semble; real
property taxes); Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673 (1912) (exclusion of

immigrant); Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 at 459 (1920); Van Vleck,

The Administrative Control of Aliens at 51f, 53, lllf, 233f: Spiller v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 253 U.S. 117 (1920) (Interstate Commerce Commission); Consolidated Edison Company v.
National Laor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
' For instance, in Spiller v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, cited supra note 96, it was not seriously contended that the
evidence introduced was inaccurate. It consisted of extracts from
original books of entry which would have filled a freight car.
"Which requires that an administrative determination must be
supported by substantial evidence if it is to pass judicial review.
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"The companies urge that the Board received remote hearsay
and mere rumor. The statute provides that the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The
obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative [2303 boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the
mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order.
. . . But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
proceedings does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute evidence.""

This, perhaps, is as neat a solution of the problem as could
be found.' 00
TaE

PROCESS OF DETERMINATION

Constitutional requirements are not satisfied by the mere
proper conduct of a hearing.

In

making a decision the admin-

istrative tribunal is still held within bounds.

Its action must be

based on evidence introduced at the hearing and incorporated
into the record; it cannot disregard evidence; in some cases it
must make formal findings of fact; lastly, it must decide upon
principle and not arbitrarily.
A Basis in Evidence Incorporated into the Record-While

some doubt may be entertained in the fields of taxation' 0 1 and
control of aliens,10 2 it is reasonably clear as to the mass of ad"Consolidated Edison Company v. National Labor Relations
Board, 305 U.S. 197 at 229f. (1938).
11 Expansion of the business entry exception to the hearsay rule
Obviously the basic facts in
might have been another.
issue before administrative tribunals vary enormously in difficulty
of proof. Some matters, which might be termed "continuing
facts," are rarely the subject of serious dispute. In this category
belong such issues as the distance between two geographical points.
A second category of facts may include those which lie in the past
but which are certified by records made contemporaneously. In
ascertaining the cost of a public utility's property, for instance, the
books of the corporation, its cancelled checks, the records of the
bank upon which the checks were drawn and so forth often establish
matters reasonably conclusively. A third category may include facts
lying in the past as to which no record was made contemporaneously.
Thus, the precise conduct of the parties just before the occurrence of
an automobile accident is not recorded. It is in this third category
that controversy flourishes, and if additional safeguards are thought
necessary in the conduct of administrative hearings, they might well
be confined to proceedings involving this category of facts.
"'Valuation of property for tax purposes involves comparisons
of an intangible character with other property not always readily
susceptible to incorporation in a record.
See United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131 at 134
(1924); cf. Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226
U.S. 272 (1912); United States ex rel. Vaitauer v. Commissioner, 273
U.S. 103 (1927); see also Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 at 42 (1924).
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ministrative proceedings that administrative action may only
be based upon evidence received at the hearing and incorporated
into a written record.1 03 The requisite quantum of evidence is,
of course, a matter pertaining to the scope of judicial review.
But it may be pertinent to note here that in certain types of
proceedings typical evidence-a representative sample of the
facts-will suffice to support an administrative order. Thus, in
rate making, it is not essential that evidence be introduced as to
every commodity upon every conceivable route.' 0 4
Whatever may be the practice before administrative tribunals' 0 5 then, the constitutional theory is plain; an administrative tribunal must act only on information presented to it
at a hearing. Which raises the issue of judicial notice-call it
official or administrative notice or what you will. Ohio Bell Telephone Company v. Public Utilities Commission'00 involved a
rate regulation proceeding. The crucial issue was the value of
the company's property. After nearly a decade of proceedings
the commission, in 1934, valued the property as of 1925. No
objection was made to the method by which the commission arrived at this figure. To bring the valuation down to date, however, resort was had to certain "price trends." The conmission alleged that the "trend of land valuation was ascertained
from examination of the tax value in communities where the
' This doctrine was first enunciated in the important dictum in
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Railway,
227 U.S. 88 at 91f. (1913), and was followed in Philadelphia Railway
v. United States, 240 U.S. 334 (1916); Chicago Junction Case, 264
U.S. 258 (1924); Brimstone Railway v. United States, 276 U.S. 104
(1928); United States v. Baltimore & Ohio Railway, 293 U.S. 454
(1935); West Ohio Gas Company v. Public Utilities Commission, 294
U.S. 63 (1935); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 48 (1932);
Florida East Coast Railway v. United States, 234 U.S. 167 at 185f.
(1914); Louisville & Nashville Railway v. Finn, 235 U.S. 601 at 606
(1914); New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591 at 600 (1922); New
England Divisions, 261 U.S. 184 at 203 (1923); Morgan v. United
States, 298 U.S. 468 at 480 (1936).
Some of these cases proceed
partly on the ground that the commission's orders must find a basis
in evidence somehow; it is believed that they also support the
proposition that this evidence must be presented at the hearing and
incorporated into the record. See generally, Davison, Use of Public
Documents and Reports in Administrative Proceedings (1940) 25
Iowa L. Rev. 555; cf. Walter-Logan Bill (S.915, 76 Cong.) sec. 4(b).
''See Railroad Commission v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railway, 257 U.S. 563 at 579 (1922); Georgia Public Service Commission v. United States, 283 U.S. 765 at 774 (1931).
"0Cf. e.g. A.G.'s Committee on Federal Communications Commission at 29.
1301

U.S. 292 (1937).
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company had its largest real estate holdings .. .for building
trends resort was had to price indices of the Engineering News
Record, a recognized magazine in the field of engineering construction .. labor trends were developed from the same
sources." Reference was also made to the findings of a federal
court sitting in another state as to price levels in the sales of
apparatus by the Western Electric Company to the operating
corporation. These findings were not in evidence but had been
received by stipulation for certain limited purposes. The other
evidence of "price trends" was not in evidence in any form.
By the use of these data the commission fixed the value of the
company's property for the intermediate years as follows, expressed in relation to the 1925 valuation figure:
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

100%
98.73
95.7
95.0
96.3

1930
1931
1932
1933

92.2%
86.6
76.8
79.1

As a result of this computation, the company was found to have
collected excess earnings of some thirteen million dollars. It
made seasonable objection to the use of the data but the commission refused a petition for rehearing on the grounds that it
took judicial notice of the "price trends." 21r. Justice Cardozo,
speaking for a unanimous court, commented :107
"An attempt was made by the commission and again by the
state court to uphold this decision without evidence as an instance
of judicial notice. Indeed, decisions of this court were cited
as giving support to the new doctrine that the values of land and
labor and building and equipment, with all their yearly fluctuations, no longer call for evidence. Our opinions have been much
misread if they have been thought to point that way. Courts take
judicial notice of matters of common knowledge. They take judicial notice that there has been a depression, and that decline of
market values is one of its concomitants . . .How great the decline

has been for this industry or that, for one material or another, in
this year or the next, can be known only to the experts, who may
even differ among themselves ... Moreover, notice, even when
taken, has no other effect than to relieve one of the parties to a
controversy of the burden of resorting to the usual forms of evidence . . .Such at least is the general rule, to be adhered to in

the absence of exceptional conditions. Here the contention would
be futile that the precise amount of the decline in values was so
determinate or notorious in each and every year between 1925 and
1933 to be beyond the range of question . . . to press the doctrine

of judicial notice to the extent attempted in this case and to do that
retroactively after the case had been submitted, would be to turn
the doctrine into a pretext for dispensing with a trial."
301 U.S. at 300f.
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It is difficult to find fault with the views expressed by Mr.
Justice Cardozo. Nevertheless, it may be observed that there is
a growing demand that administrative procedure be expedited' 08 and it is possible that increased 1 9 use of judicial notice
would help clear crowded dockets. n ° It may be argued that
administrative bodies are expert tribunals appointed by law and
informed by experience"' and that they should be permitted to
notice all facts about which there is a general and harmonious
understanding, not only in the community generally, but among
the experts in its field. Just as courts do not take evidence as
to the law of their jurisdictions, so the Securities & Exchange
Commission should be able to take notice, for instance, of the
general state of the stock market." 2 In practice, administrative
4
3
tribunals appear to do just this," if not a good deal more" a state of affairs, which, however, throws doubt on the hope that
a reasonable extension of the doctrine of judicial notice would
expedite hearings.
There is another method by which hearings might be expedited and the rule that all evidence must be introduced at the
hearing avoided. This is the doctrine of incorporation by reference. Thus, it should be possible to take care of a good many
(especially, formal) matters of proof through citation of material
in the files of the tribunal, provided that the citation is sufficiently specific and seasonable to allow rebuttal." 5
A danger of this short-cut, however, is that the tribunal will
slip into a delegation of discretion or a vicarious hearing. It is
"SSee e.g., Smith, Practice and Procedure before the Interstate
Commerce Commission (1937) 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 404, at 453 ff.
'It
need hardly be said that a .degree of notice is inevitable.
Michael and Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact (1934) 34 Col. L.
Rev. 1224, 1462.
' Note (1934) 44 Yale L.J. 355.

'Per McKenna, J., in Illinois Central Railway v. Interstate

Commerce Commission, 206 U.S. 441 at 454 (1907).

2It will be noted that Mr. Justice Cardozo does not expressly
prohibit this taking of notice. His use of the rule as applied in
courts merely responded to the citation of cases to which he refers.
3"Faris, Judicial Notice by Administrative Bodies, (1928) 4 Ind.

L. J. 167 at 174f. (1928).

4 Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce

Commission at 202n; A. G.'s Committee on Federal Communications
at 25.
Commission
4
-u A. G.'s Committee on Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation at 14.
'' United States v. Abilene Railway, 265 U.S. 274 (1924) semble;
see United States Traction Company v. Balitmore & Southwestern
Railway, 226 U.S. 14 at 20 (1912).
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permissible for an administrative tribunal to rely on evidence
introduced at another hearing when the parties and issues were
the same. 116 But, at the other pole, the conclusions of another
administrative tribunal cannot sustain an order. In Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railway v. Public Utilities Commission"17 an error of this type was found. The Interstate Commerce Commission had authorized (but not directed) a reduction
in interstate rates on logs. No action was taken by the carrier.
Thereupon, the state commission issued an order requiring the
railway to show cause why it should not reduce its intrastate
rates on logs to the level authorized by the Interstate Commerce
Commission for interstate shipments. At the hearing the railway introduced evidence tending to show that the rates were
already so low that the traffic was carried at a loss. In ordering a
rate reduction, the state commission relied on various facts,
perhaps chiefly the findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission. A unanimous court held this procedure a denial of due
process of law." 8 This decision is sound but there remain open
many intermediate degrees of vicarious hearing, the validity of
9
which remains to be tested."1
Disregarding Evidence-A lawyer familiar with judicial
procedure would not be surprised to learn that the record of an
administrative hearing must incorporate all the evidence, whether
favorable or adverse 120 to the administrative determination. But
it might occasion some astonishment for him to learn that special
treatment is required of adverse evidence. It is apparently' 21
law, however, that an administrative tribunal may not disregard
evidence submitted it.122 Thus, in Northern Pacific Railway v.
"8 Alabama v. United States, 283 U.S. 776 (1931).
U.S. 344 (1927).
See 274 U.S. at 352.
" Could the basic facts introduced in evidence before the I.C.C.
have been incorporated by reference in the principal case instead of
11274
"

the findings (ultimate facts)? Would it make a difference if the
carrier had been a party to the I.C.C. proceedings? Could the I.C.C.

decision properly be cited in the commission's opinion? As a proposition of law? As a proposition of fact-law-discretion?
'"Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920).
"I Qualification is necessary for it may be possible to explain the
authorities on the well known principle that administrative action
must find support in substantial evidence.
" Ohio Utilities Company v. Public Utilities Commission, 267
U.S. 359 (1925); Northern Pacific Railway v. Department of Public
Works, 268 U.S. 39 (1925); Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific
Railway v. Public Utilities Comnmission, 274 U.S. 344 (1927); Tod v.
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Department of Public Works, 123 the administrative authority
issued an order reducing rates on logs carried within the state.
At the hearing the carrier introduced evidence that the proposed
rates would not be productive of a fair return. This evidence was
ignored by the tribunal; no attempt was made to explain or rebut
it in the order reducing rates. Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote an
opinion for a unanimous court, holding the procedure invalid.
It may not even be necessary that the evidence be presented
at the hearing. It may suffice that the matter disregarded is of
such general and common understanding that the resulting order
is patently irrational. 124 Again, the same rule seems to be applied
when a rehearing is requested in order to present such evidence,
and the rehearing is denied. 125 Later authorities 26 indicate, at
least, that the rule will be extended no farther. Indeed, it seems
probable that further extension of the rule would thrust an undue
burden on administrative tribunals. It is certainly enough that
they must take account of evidence adverse to their determina1 27
tions.
Findings of Fact-Few points of constittitional law are so
shrouded in mystery as the origin of the doctrine that an administrative tribunal must make written findings of fact. The presence of findings requirements in statutes and lack of precision in
the opinions make the search for beginnings arduous.
Probably the first hint in the Supreme Court is found in
cases arising out of the administrative control of aliens some two
Waldman, 266 U.S. 113 (1924); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287
But cf. Hilton v. Merritt, 110 U.S. 97 (1884).
U.S. 329 (1932).
'SOp. cit. supra note 122.
'Great Northern Railway v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135 (1936)
(Stone, Cardozo and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) semble; But see
Nashville Railway v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 at 371 (1940); cf. McCart v. Indianapolis Water Company, 302 U.S. 419 (1938) (judicial
proceedings).
'Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. United States (The
Grain Case), 284 U.S. 248 (1932); cf. Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 484 at 582,
49 U.S.C.A. sec. 16a; Pittsburgh Railway v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421
(1894); Freund, Administrative Powers at 157; see 4 Sharfman, The
Interstate Commerce Commission at 237.
States v. Northern Pacific Railway, 288 U.S. 490
'United
(1933); Mississippi Valley Barge Line v. United States, 292 U.S. 282
(1934); see St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 at
47 (1936).

"' Query, whether such account must be taken in findings of fact,
a written opinion or elsewhere. In most cases, one suspects, the
administrative tribunal is expected to take account of the evidence
in its determination.
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decades ago. Relying on one of his own opinions128 in a rate ease,
in which he had cited an Illinois rate case based on a statute
requiring the making of findings, and upon his own statement
that such requirement accords with general principles of constitutional government, Chief Justice Taft nourished 129 the doctrine
to full growth 130 in holding that, where the statute required the
commissioner to find certain facts as a prerequisite to action, he
must make such a finding in the record. Later the same doctrine
was applied in a subsequent rate case. 13 1 But in a later opinion
by Mr. Justice Stone in a rate case a different result was
33
reached 13 2 without reference to the above cases. And again
the celebrated decision of the Court' in Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan' 35 Chief Justice Hughes (writing the opinion) held that
there was a constitutional requirement of findings in administrative action of a clearly legislative character ;136 and another case
decided the same day affirmed the doctrine as to administrative
proceedings of a more judicial character.'3 7
Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote the opinion in this last case.
Along with a half-hearted attempt to put the decision on statutory grounds, 138 he distinguished between findings which are a
mere aid to judicial review and "essential" and "quasi-jurisdictional" findings, which are constitutionally required. In the
next case, Mr. Justice Brandeis was unable to agree with the
majority that the findings rose to this latter dignity; that is, were
"quasi-jurisdictional."139 This circumstance alone should throw
" See Wichita Railway v. Public Utilities Commission, 260 U.S.
48 at 58 (1922).
'"See Mahier v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 at 44 (1924) ("we put this con-

clusion not only on the language of the statute but also on general
principles of constitutional government").

"Tod v. Waldman, 266 U.S. 113 (1924); cf. Immigration Act of
1917, 39 Stat. 874 at 887, 8 U.S.C.A. sec. 153.

"'Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194 (1931).
...
United States v. Louisiana, 290 U.S. 70 (1933); cf. Florida v.
United States, 292 U.S. 1 (1934).
' See Williston, Some Modern Tendencies in the Law at 86.
"'Except Mr. Justice Cardozo.
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
Presumably to be exercised without hearing.
"'United States v. Baltimore & Ohio Railway, 293 U.S. 454
(1935).
" See 293 U.S. at 465; cf. Hepburn Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 587 at
589 (amending sec. 14 of the Interstate Commerce Act); 49 U.S.C.A.
sec. 14.

'Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. United States, 295
U.S. 193 (1935). Brandeis and Cardozo, JJ., concurred in the
dissent of Stone, J.
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some doubt on the soundness of the doctrine.140 Apparently,
however, it is still with us. 141 About all that may be said is that
findings must be made on quasi-jurisdictional (i.e., important)
matters in quasi-judicial administrative proceedngs-provided,
the court does not again change its mind. 142
Of course, it is impossible to lay down a specific rule as to
the requisite precision of findings. It seems,' 43 however, that
something must be spelt out beyond mere "coiifficting infer14 4
ences. "
The Role of Principle-In making its determination upon
the basis of evidence and findings, an administrative tribunal
must, of course, exercise its reason. It must use its own judgment: it may not delegate its power of decision.' 45 Nor may
others exercise its powers by coercion or fraud. 140 Irrational,
arbitrary or whimsical decisions are invalid as an abuse of discretion.' 4 7 It is, therefore, evident that principles of some kind
must underlie every valid administrative determination. The
questions open for debate relate to the nature of these principles,
whether they must be articulated in an opinion, and whether certain pertinent rules developed in judicial proceedings must be
applied.
Apparently the doctrine of res judicata is not a constitutional requirement of administrative proceedings. 4 8 A shadow
I' Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
' See Baltimore & Ohio Railway v. United States, 298 U.S. 349
at 368 (1936); cf. Virginian Railway v. System Federation, 300 U.S.
515 (1937). cf. Walter-Logan Bill (S. 915, 76 Cong.) see. 4 (b), (e).
'Apparently the requirement no longer obtains as to quasilegislative action. Pacific States Box & Basket Company v. White,
296 U.S. 176 (1935).
' Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. United States, 295
U.S. 193 (1935).
'"Per Cardozo, J., in United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul & Pacific Railway, 294 U.S. 499 at 510 (1935).
1 Brooklyn City Railway v. Tax Commissioners, 199 U.S. 48
(1905) semble; Hedden v. Iselin, 142 U.S. 676 (1892); United States
v. New York Central Railway, 263 U.S. 603 (1924). But cf. Lent v.
Tilson, 140 U.S. 316 (1891).
1See e.g. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway v. Babcock,
204 U.S. 585 at 592, 598 (1907).
'-"Atlantic Coast Line v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328 (1907)
semble;
see Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting
Company, 309 U.S. 134 at 143f. (1940).
'Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281 (1906) (Harlan, Brewer and
Peckham, J.J., dissenting): cf. Brougham v. Blanton Manufacturing
Company, 249 U.S. 495 (1919); see United States v. Burchard, 125
U.S. 176 at 180 (1888).
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of doubt was cast upon the earlier authorities by the Arizona
Grocer's case.149 Here the Interstate Commerce Commission had
issued an order to the effect that a certain rate was unreasonable
to the extent that it exceeded ninety-six cents. Four years later
the commission reconsidered the matter and sought to fix a maximum of seventy-one cents retroactively, awarding reparation for
the intervening period. This action was held invalid. But the
doubt thus created was dispelled by a later decision, limiting the
authority of the Arizona Grocer's case and stating that it rested
only upon statutory grounds. 150
Nor is stare decisis, as known to courts of law, a requirement
of administrative action.' 5 ' Many administrative tribunals are
frankly created in an experimental spirit which would be defeated by the strict application of these doctrines. 52 In practice
it is found impossible to apply them satisfactorily.' 53 But a modified application seems not only desirable but necessary. In the
long run, at least,' 54 we cannot be content with determinations
based on mere "hunch" or worse. Law, in an administrative
tribunal, need not have a static content, but it must not be whimsical. Fundamentally, stare decisis is a shorthand method of exercising reason: it shows that the tribunal has given the matter
at hand consideration, and, after examination of the views of
others, approved a given decision and held it to be controlling.
This process gives assurance of reasoned results. On the other
hand, there is an equal assurance if the authority is examined,
and rejected for specified causes.
" Arizona Grocery Company v. Atchison; Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway, 284 U.S. 370 (1932); cf. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Com-

pany, 306 U.S. 110 (1939); Note (1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 672; see
United States v. Bank of Metropolis, 40 U.S. 377 at 400 ff. (1841).
'1 See Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Company, 287 U.S.
358, at 362 (1932); cf. United States v. Stone & Downer Company,
274 U.S. 225 (1927). See Griswold, Res Judicata in Federal Tax
Cases1 (1937) 46 Yale L.J. 1320.

" Georgia Public Service Commission v. United States, 283 U.S.
765 (1931). See brief of petitioner at 75f.
I It will be noted that problems of res judicatashade into those
of judicial review and collateral attack.

I See Bevis, Procedure in the Interstate Commerce Commission
(1927) 1 U. Cin. L. Rev. 241, at 245 ff.; Hyneman, Administrative
Adjudication: An Analysis (1936) 51 Pol. Sci. Q. 383, 516, at 528;
Pittman, Doctrine of Precedents and the Interstate Commerce Commission (1937) 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 543. But see A. G.'s Committee
on Maritime Commission, at 20.
"See Pound, Justice According to Law (1914) 13 Col. L. Rev.
696, 14 Col. L. Rev. 1, at 18.

K. L. J.-3
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West Ohio Gas Company v. Public Utilities Commission' 5 s
involved proceedings to fix gas rates in two nearby towns served
by the same utility company. As to each town, the question was
raised whether property of the company situated in the outlying
parts of the municipalities to be served should be included in the
valuation for the rate base. It happened that if such outlying
property were included the utility would secure a higher rate in
one town than in another, and vice versa if the property were
excluded. Without assigning a reason therefor the commission
adopted different rules for the two towns so that in each case the
utility received the lower rate. This action was condemned as an
exercise of arbitrary power, Mr. Justice Cardozo reprimanding
the administrative agency sharply. It is submitted that the decision is sound and supports the suggestion just made, namely,
that departures from the rule of stare decisis should be explained.
It is abundantly clear, however, that an administrative tribunal need not prepare an opinion in all cases.' 5" As Mr. Justice
Holmes declared in a case where the lack of opinion was complained of :157
"The action does not seem to have been arbitrary except in the

sense in which many honest and sensible judgments are so. They
express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums
up many unnamed and tangled impressions; impressions which may
lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth."

One may agree with the justice and also appreciate that the
task of preparing opinions would consume much of the administrator's precious time. Yet there are weighty reasons for hoping
that the preparation of opinions will soon become administrative
practice, if no more. 158
Two interesting questions remain. First, suppose a plainly
-294

U.S. 63 (1935).

284 U.S. 498 (1932).

cf. Miller v. Nut Margarine Company,

""Brooklyn City Railway v. Tax Commissioners, 199 U.S. 48

(1905); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway v. Babcock, 204 U.S.

585 (1907); see Baltimore & Ohio Railway v. United States, 298 U.S.
349 at 359 (1936); Railroad Commission v. Pacific Gas Company, 302
U.S. 338 at 393f. (1938); Robson, Justice and Administrative Law at
220f. 7
1 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway v. Babcock, 204 U.S.
585 at 598 (1907).
'See Landis, The Administrative Process, at 105 ff.; Henderson,
The Federal Trade Commission, at 334; Robson, Justice and Administrative Law, at 206 ff.; Frankfurter Address (1938) 12 U. Cin. L.

Rev. 260, at 276; A. G.'s Committee on Bureau of Marine Inspection
and Navigation, at 17.
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indefensible reason to be given for an administrative determination which could otherwise be supported by valid reasons in the
record. It is ordered that an alien be expelled, and the reason
assigned is that he has red hair. On this matter the authorities
are not clear.159 Since the invalid reason casts suspicion on the
determination, it would seem wise at least to return the matter to
the administrative tribunal for reconsideration.1 60
Second, the administrative action may be perfectly regular
upon its face and yet a reviewing court feel sure that the tribunal's real motives were concealed. A board of health has power
to regulate the sale of milk. 'It proscribes a paper container for
milk, assigning as a reason that it is not sufficiently sanitary.
There is no evidence in the record to support the order. Yet
there is also evidence in the record to the effect that paper containers are sanitary. A reviewing court feels certain that the
real reason behind the board's action is a fear that paper containers will throw milk wagon drivers out of employment. Yet
the jurisdiction of the board of health does not extend to such
matters. Little assistance is derived from the authorities.' 61
The same problem has been met in passing upon the validity of
statutes,1 62 although perhaps the most positive suggestion that
can be made on this subject is that tolerance allowed legislators,
directly responsible to the electorate, may be unsuitable for ad63
ministrators.1
' Cf. Georgia Railway Company v. Decatur, 295 U.S. 165 (1935)
(Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo, JJ., dissenting); Great Northern Railway v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135 (1936) (Stone, Cardozo and Brandeis,
J.J., dissenting); St. Louis & O'Fallon Railway v. United States, 279

U.S. 461 (1929)

(Brandeis, Holmes & Stone, J.J. dissenting; Butler,

J, taking no part); Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123 (1935); (all
these cases suggest invalidity) with Railroad Commission v. Pacific
Gas Company, 302 U.S. 388 (1938). As to judicial practice see
Indiana Farmers' Guide v. Prairie Farmer Company, 293 U.S. 268 at
281 (1934)
"=Cf. Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company,
281 U.S. 464 (1930); United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939);
Hells v. Ward, 308 U.S. 365 (1939) .(judicial proceedings).
'Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564 (1927) (see dissent of McReynolds, J). See Baltimore & Ohio Railway v. United States, 277
U.S. 291 at 300 (1928).
cf. United States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S.
390 (1906).
1
See e.g., Marshall, C.J., in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
at 423 (1819); cf. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 321.
" As to French and British practice, see Riesenfeld, The French
System of Administrative Justice (1938) 18 B.U.L. Rev. 48, 400 at
425; Robson, Justice and Administrative Law at 232f, 321.
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PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION

There remain problems of personnel and organization. Who
must represent parties to administrative hearings? Who may
conduct the hearing? Who is to make the decision? Without
pausing to examine the doctrine of separation of powers, which
appears nearly to have fallen into desuetude, we may examine
three principal questions: the requisite personnel of the hearing, the necessity of oral argument, and the delegation of
decision.
Personnel-An administrative agency, like a purely executive officer, may be charged by statute with the inforcement
of legislative policy. An atmosphere may be created whereby
an administrative officer feels responsible for a situation. Can
it be argued that this mixture of governmental powers makes
the officer a judge in his own cause, and thus prevents him
sitting in judgment upon an administrative tribunal?
It is clear, if unadjudicated, that it would be improper for
an administrative officer to hold any kind of pecuniary interest
in the cause upon which he sits. 164 The tribunal must be impartial.165 Personal animosity toward a party to an administrative
proceeding should also cause disqualification.' 6" But it is equally
clear that mere distaste for a party by reason of his membership
in some social, economic, or racial group is not grounds for disqualification. Such a requirement would bring the wheels of
administrative justice to a standstill. Nor may the fact that an
administrative officer is elected by persons who would benefit
from action adverse to a given party (as, in public utility rate
making) give rise to disqualification. 167 Again, there is nothing
to suggest that the fact that administrative officers have participated in a preliminary investigation, leading to a decision to
'Cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
See Brandeis, J., dissenting, in St. Joseph Stockyards v. United
States, 298 U.S. 38 at 73 (1936). But cf. Lent v. Tilson, 140 U.S. 316
(1891); Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310 (1903).
'Cf. (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1101.
'Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347 (1884)
(Field, J, dissenting); cf. Home Telephone Company v. Los Angeles,
211 U.S. 265 (1908) (municipality vested with power to regulate
rates was itself a consumer; held, valid). Query: the validity of

"influence" exercised by legislators over administrative determinations.
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issue a complaint, prevents them sitting in judgment. 168 There
is some doubt, however, as to whether it is permissible for a
business competitor to exercise discretionary judgment over
another's affairs.'6 9
Frequently employees of administrative agencies are put
on the witness stand to testify in a hearing. 17 0
While there
may be certain dangers in this practice, it does not appear to
have been raised as a constitutional question.1 71 No doubt the
general abolition of the disqualification for interest in judicial
proceedings would provide an appropriate analogy.
Little can be made, therefore, of the argument that an administrative adjudication is invalidated because the administrators act in their own cause. It appears equally clear that even
federal administrative tribunals may dispense with the jury
trial requirement of the Seventh Amendment. 17 2 This result
has been reached even as to administrative orders closely resembling money judgments on the ground that they were not
"suits at common law.' ' 7 3 Apparently sufficient doubt is felt
about the matter, however, that the draftsmen of the Interstate
Commerce Act did not provide for the direct administrative
17 4
award of reparation.
It is now settled that in judicial proceedings, at least those
of a criminal character, due process requires that the parties
I This is frequently the practice. A. G.'s Committee on Federal
Communications Commission at 22f; on Bureau of Marine Inspection
and Navigation at 11; on Division of Public Contracts at 12 cf. Walter-Logan Bill (S. 915, 76 Cong.) sec. 4 (a).
' See Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 at 311 (1936)
(Cardozo, Brandeis and Stone, JJ., dissenting). cf. A. G.'s Committee on Railroad Retirement Board at 7. See Freund, Legislative
Regulation par. 23.
I" See e.g. 4 Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission at
199.
7 Raised below but not on appeal in Passavant v. United States,
148 U.S. 214 (1893).
1,2 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Company,
59 U.S. 272 (1856); Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1890); see
also Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101 at 105 (1927).
"'See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, at 48 (1937). As to eminent domain proceedings, see Blair, Federal Condemnation Proceedings and the
Seventh Amendment (1927) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 29, collating the
authorities.
"Presumably on the theory that such suits were cognizable at
common law. See Miller, The Necessity for Preliminary Resort to
the InterstateCommerce Commission (1932) 1 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 49,
at 77; cf. Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railway, 236 U.S. 412 (1915).
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have an opportunity to be represented by counsel. 1 7 5 It is difficult to understand why a different rule should obtain as to administrative hearings. The law, however, appears to be otherwise,' 7 6 even as to those administrative proceedings which bear
a strong resemblance to criminal trials.177 At least, once the
practice of holding an alien, sought to be expelled, incommunicado (so that he could not secure counsel or prepare his evi78
dence) has been approved.'
Great hardship and patent unfairness may result from a
refusal to permit representation by counsel. 179 It is submitted
that the opportunity to be represented by counsel should be a
requirement of due process of law and that the authorities to the
contrary should be reconsidered. If at times lawyers are found
to encumber the administrative process unduly, some remedy
other than their own total exclusion should be found. It is unnecessary to remark upon the practice of holding persons incommunicado.
Argument and Tentative Findings-Apparentlythere is no
constitutional requirement that argument be permitted before
an administrative tribunal;180 and, if granted, the argument
may be written instead of oral.' 8 ' If the hearing is held before
a trial examiner it is not imperative that he submit tentative
findings of fact to the parties as basis for argument before the
"'Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932).
"Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1890); Origet v. Hedden,
155 U.S. 228 (1894) semble.

' United States v. Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904) (Brewer and Peckham, J.J., dissenting vigorously); Japanese Immigrant Case
(Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S.
460 (1912); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923). cf. Poy v.
Johnson, 273 U.S. 352 (1927).
"' United States v. Tuck, cited supra note 177. Mr. Justice
Holmes, writing the majority opinion, strangely asserts that jailing
the alien
did not impede him in the presentation of his defense.
79
See Van Vleck, The Administrative Control of Aliens at 231f;
Oppenheimer, The Administration of the DeportationLaws at 107;
Pound, The Administrative Application of Legal Standards, (1919)
44 A. B. A. Rep. 445 at 464f..
IAuffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1890); Home Telephone
Company v. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908) semble; but see Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 at 386 (1908); Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1 at 18 (1938).
'See
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 at 481f. (1936).
Accord: Local Government Board Iv. Arlidge, (1913) 1 A. C. 120.
cf. 4 Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission at 230f.
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tribunal itself.182 There is, therefore, a good deal of permissible flexibility in arranging for posthearing consideration of
the evidence.
But at some point the issues must be brought to focus.
Whether in the complaint, by the submission of proposed findings of fact or by oral argument or briefs, there must be an
opportunity to know upon what matters the determination will
turn. This is the doctrine of the celebrated second Morgan
case. L83 This case involved a proceeding by the Secretary of Agriculture looking to the fixing of rates charged by livestock commission men. Of course, the complaint stated merely the general
purpose of the proceedings. At the hearing before a trial examiner an enormous mass of evidence was introduced. Despite the
request of the commission men, no tentative report of findings of
fact was prepared by the examiner. The commission men submitted a brief and later a "sketchy" oral argument was had
before the acting Secretary of Agriculture. No brief was presented upon behalf of the government.
After the argument, tentative fidings were prepared by
counsel for the government and submitted to the secretary along
with a report, which summarized the government's evidence.
The secretary also was supplied with the commission men's brief,
a copy of the record and transcript of the argument. After some
examination of these documents, he conferred with his subordinates, including government counsel, out of the presence of representatives of the commission men. He then issued an order,
having made iome changes in the proposed findings of fact.
This is the procedure which the court found defective. The
Chief Justice said :184
"The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present
evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of
the opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit argument implies that opportunity; otherwise the right may be but a
barren one. Those who are brought into contest with the government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their
activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government
'National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Company, 304 U.S. 333 (1938); see Consolidated Edison Company v.
National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197 at 226f. (1938).
Accord: Local Government Board v. Arlidge (1913) 1 A. C. 120.
v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938). The decision
'Morgan
could be placed upon purely statutory grounds.
1304 U.S. at 18f. Black, J., dissented (without opinion).
Cardozo and Reed, JJ., took no part.
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proposed and to be heard on its proposals before it issues its final
command."
This doctrine may be compared with the rule that evidence must
18 5
be subject to attack.
Focusing of the issues is the essence of the requirement and
of course there will always be room for debate as to whether
this has been accomplished in a given administrative proceeding.
It should be possible, however, to distinguish broadly between
those which center on a few specific facts and those which involve broad investigations of economic and sociological data,
just as we distinguish between trover for a bay horse and an
equitable accounting on the part of trustees for vast numbers of
investments. 8 6
Delegation of authority-It is common practice to delegate
the task of holding an administrative hearing, including such
tasks as ruling upon the admissibility of evidence, to an employee of the administrative agency. Such a person, frequently
not a member of the administrative tribunal, is often called a
"trial examiner."
While authority is meager, this delegation
would appear to be constitutionally valid. 8 7 It is, of course,
supported by the analogy of reference to a master in chancery
or referee in bankruptcy.
Delegation of the task of conducting a hearing is commonplace in both judicial and administrative proceedings. Whether
the duty of decision may be delegated is quite another matter,
and whether administrative determinations must be the result
of personal discretion or mere nominal action is a question going
to the heart of administrative procedure. It was the view of our
leading student of administrative law that while judicial action
must be personal, the volume of business forces delegation upon
administrative officers, many of whom may also have other
tasks.1 88 This view likens administrative tribunals to the regular
See generally Freund, Administrative Powers, at 161, 157; cf.
A. G.'s Committee on Federal Alcohol Administration, at 25; see
Riesenfeld, The French System of Administrative Justice (1938) 18
B.U.L. Rev. 48, 400, 715 at 727.
1 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 23 (1938) (rehearing
denied).
'See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 at 481f. (1936);
Anniston Manufacturing Company v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337 at 356
(1937). But see Redmond, The Securities Exchange Act (1938) 47
Yale L. J. 622 at 640.
1 See Freund, Administrative Powers at 31f.
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executive departments of government and is in accord with the
notion that they should not be allowed to become a "headless
89
fourth branch" of authority.'
'When this question came before the House of Lords in the
celebrated case of Local Government Board v. Arlidge,190 it was
held that in administrative determination the nominal authority
need not take actual personal or mental cognizance of a case, but
might assume responsibility for conclusions vicariously
reached. 191 For many years the issue was dormant in the United
States. Occasionally there were decisions on the subject in the
United States Supreme Court but they were isolated cases, not
referring to one another, and not creative of doctrine. Some
suggested that the British view would prevail' 9 2 whereas others
implied that personal action would be required of administrators. 1 93 Many of these authorities related to "service" functions of government or action in the ten executive departments
of government and none of them were even cited' 94 in the great
case which settled our law, the first decision in Morgan v. United
States.'95
Power was conferred upon the secretary of agriculture to
prices charged by livestock commission men by the
the
fix
Packers & Stockyards Act. 106 A bill was brought seeking an
injunction against the enforcement of the rate order. A hearing
"See Report of President's Committee on Administrative
Management (1937) at 40f.
A. C. 120 (1915).
'Freund, Administrative Powers at 160.
'Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U.S. 53 (1912); United States ex rel
(proceedings of courts
French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922)
martial); Hannibal Bridge Company v. United States, 221 U.S. 194
(1911); Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673 (1912); United States v. Page,
137 U.S. 673 (1891); Norris v. United States, 257 U.S. 77 (1921); De
Cambra v. Rogers, 189 U.S. 119 (1903)
'Kennedy v. Gibson, 75 U.S. 498 (1869); see Federal Radio
Commission v. Nelson Brothers, 289 U.S. 266 at 285f. (1933).
" Strangely enough, Local Government Board v. Arlidge cited
supra note 182, was not even mentioned in the government's brief
and only receives casual mention in the opinion.
298 U.S. 468 (1936).
'"Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 159 at 166, 7
U. S. C. A. sec. 211: 'Whenever after full hearing... the Secretary
is of opinion that any rate... is or-will be unjust ... the Secretary
may determine and prescribe what will be the reasonable rate ...."
It will be noted that the words "after full hearing" permit the resting of the decision in Morgan v. United States upon statutory
grounds. But cf. 42 Stat. at 168, 7 U.S.C.A. sec. 402 (secretary may

prosecute an inquiry in person or by such agents as he may
designate).
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had been properly held but, the bill alleged, oral argument had
been made to an assistant secretary of agriculture whereas the
secretary himself signed the order reducing the rates of the
commission men. It was further alleged, on information and
belief, that the secretary himself not only had not heard the
arguments but had given no consideration to the transcripts
thereof or the evidence taken before the trial examiner. On
demurrer, a unanimous court held this procedure invalid. The
rule was enunciated that he-who decides must hear, the Chief
Justice declaring :197
"The hearing is designed to afford the safeguard that the one
who decides shall be bound in good conscience to consider the evidence, to be bound by that alone, and to reach- his conclusion
uninfluenced by extraneous considerations which in other fields
might have play in determining purely executive action ... If the

one who determines the facts which underlie the order has not
considered the evidence or argument, it is manifest that hearing has
not been given.

When the case reached the court a second time light was shed
on how much personal attention must be given the matter by an
administrator,19 8 but the precise amount of assistance which
may be rendered him remains open to further clarification.1 99
Despite the rude jolt which this decision gave many administrative agencies which had framed their procedure upon the
pattern of nominal action 20 0 and the burden which it places
upon the administrative process, 201 there are many arguments
in its favor. Personal consideration, as opposed to anonymity,
may be an important safeguard against arbitrary action. Divorce of purely executive from adjudicatory tasks may result
from this rule and this should insulate the administrative determination from political pressure. 20 2 Historical considera187

''

298 U. S. at 480f.

See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 at 17f. (1938).
"E.g, may attorneys in a "review division", who have heard

neither evidence nor argument, summarize the record and make

proposed findings of fact? See 298 U.S. at 481f.
"1Cf. A. G.'s Committee on Division of Public Contracts at 15f,
20. Is the Walter-Logan Bill (S. 915, 76 Cong.) constitutional in
providing that determinations of appeal boards shall be subject to

modification of the agency concerned (sec. 4 (b))?
"Enforced delegation may add substantially to the cost of

government, for instance. See generally, Stason, Administrative
Tribunals-Organizationand Reorganization (1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev.

533.

"2 Cf. Wallace, Letter in New York Times of 8 May 1938 at E 8,
intimating that the whole procedure considered in Morgan v. United
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tions, too, may play a part. In subjecting the citizenry to new
forms of government control it may be advisable to go to considerable lengths at first in affording safeguards against arbitrary action. Thus protection is afforded against hasty or overzealous administrators and the persons affected are made to feel
that their interests are not wholly disregarded. As the control
becomes a commonplace it may be possible to expedite procedure
without losing co-operation.
An administrative hearing could be conceived of as a far
more summary proceeding than these authorities require. It
could consist merely of an opportunity to make an oral statement to a deputy official, upon whose desk lay a file of information collected by clerks. 203 But for better or worse, the courts
insist upon an adversary proceeding, not essentially dissimilar
from their own: an administrative hearing, as described herein,
is neither so solemn as a criminal trial nor so casual as an investigation by a committee of the legislature.
To friends of the administrative process these procedural
requirements may seem unduly burdensome. It may appear to
them that matters of substance are sacrificed for the preservation of rigid, technical rules of due process. We must not forget,
however, that "there are very precious values of civilization,
which ultimately, to a very large extent, are procedural in their
nature. '204 And if hearings are somewhat less expeditious than
would be the case under a more summary system we may re20 5
member that,
"It takes space to feel, it takes time to know, and great organisms as well as small have to pause, more or less, to possess themselves and to be aware."

States cited supra note 195 was initiated by political pressure. See
Landis, The Administrative Process at 101f.
Cf. A. G.'s Committee on Railroad Retirement Board at 22.
Address of Mr. Justice Frankfurter (1938) 12 U. Cin. L. Rev.
260 at 276.
James, preface to Altar of the Dead.

